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'It is ultimately the competitive activities of undertakings driven by
self-interest to trade across frontiers, which makes the single market a
reality. "
- Adam Smith
In the 1990s, the European Union has become highly focused on
competitiveness. 2 The dynamics of economic integration and the need
for job growth in the midst of a more globally competitive and techno-
logically-oriented environment have created this impetus. 3 Community
institutions, primarily the European Commission (Commission), have
focused on promoting economic efficiency via policy harmonization
among national economies and liberalization and privatization within
national economies.
4
* J.D. Candidate, May 2000.
1. CHRISTOFER BELLAMY & GRAHAM CHILD COMMON MARKET LAW OF COMPETITION,
16 & n.2 (3d ed. 1987).
2. The title "European Union" was used after the implementation of the Maastricht
Treaty in November 1993 to reflect the increased economic, political, and social integra-
tion of the organization. Prior to that, the organization was referred to as the European
Community. Barbara Crutchfield George et al., The Dilemma of the European Union:
Balancing the Power of the Supranational EU Entity against the Sovereignty of its Inde-
pendent Member Nations, 9 PACE INT'L L. REV. 111, 111 n.1 (1997). The term Community
will be used throughout this article to refer to the European Union.
3. See Growth, Competitiveness, and Employment: The Challenges and Ways For-
ward into the 21", Century: White Paper from the Commission to the European Council,
COM(93)700 Final [hereinafter Commission White Paper] (discussing the link between
competition and employment and the necessary conditions to enhance both). In particu-
lar, the White Paper states, "[T]he [Member State] regulatory environment is still too
rigid, and administrative and managerial traditions too centralized and compartmental-
ized ... [G]overnment policies are often still too defensive and do not take sufficient ac-
count of the new constraints imposed by global competition." Commission White Paper,
art. II, ch. 2(A).
4. See Dana L. Romaniuk, Note, Regulating Public Monopolies in Furtherance of the
EEC Free Competition Goal: Article 90 and the Two-Step Approach, 69 CHICAGO-KENT L.
REV. 1025, 1068-69 (1994); Mario Siragusa, Privatization and EC Competition Law, 19
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The European Court of Justice (Court) has supported the Commis-
sion's pro-market efforts.5 In Job Centre Coop arl, the Court affirmed
its legal approaches to support the Commission objective of limiting
Member State support for public monopolies. 6 The Court held that
Italian legislation prohibiting private entities within Italy from engag-
ing as intermediaries in the State's demand and supply of labor, i.e.,
private employment/recruitment agencies, violated Community Law
and thus, was invalid.
7
In light of legal precedent, as well as political and economic forces
within the Community, this Case comment discusses how the Court
uses the Treaty of the European Union's (EU Treaty) legal mechanisms
or "tools" to promote the Commission's objectives. This comment argues
that Job Centre confirms the Court's legal approach in order to support
the Commission's objective of liberalizing public monopolies. The
Court's approach has been to rely increasingly upon Article 90 of the
competition articles and to interpret its terms favorably toward the
Commission's perspective, finding Member States liable more fre-
quently for public monopoly behavior. Nevertheless, Job Centre is also
a political reminder to the Court that Community law is reaching into
realms traditionally managed by Member States. Considering that the
Court's ability to influence stems from Member State courts, the Court




The European Union was initially created as the European Eco-
nomic Community (EEC) in 1958.8 The treaty that created the EEC,
commonly known as the Treaty of Rome, ambitiously sought to estab-
lish a common market. 9 While the EEC has amended the Treaty of
Rome several times to widen and deepen economic and political integra-
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 999, 999-1001 (1996). The primary EU institutions are: the Commis-
sion, the "executive branch" of the Community, responsible for initiating, implementing
and enforcing EU policy and law; the Council, the primary legislative role, debates and
approves policy; and the European Parliament, originally an advisory body, now plays a
more substantive role in the legislative process following the Maastricht Treaty. George
et al., supra note 2, at 119-201
5. BELLAMY & CHILD, supra note 1, at 32-33; Siragusa, supra note 4, at 1068.
6. Case C-55/96, Job Centre Coop. arl, [1998] 4 C.M.L.R. 708 (1997).
7. Id.
8. Rudiger Dohms, Energy Panel: The Development of a Competitive Internal Energy




tion, the fundamental economic tools have remained the same.10 In
particular, the Treaty of Rome has aimed to promote free movement of
goods, services, labor, and capital (the four freedoms)," and to ensure
that competition among the States do not become distorted as a result. 12
The Community framers, however, also envisioned some autonomy for
Member States in maintaining their own economic and social policies.' 3
Thus, while economic integration of Member State policies was the pri-
mary goal of the EU Treaty, it also provided Member States with some
ability to manage and control their own individual policies.
For the purpose of this discussion, the EU Treaty articles pertain-
ing to competition will be analyzed. The "competition articles" promote
economic integration by ensuring that Member State markets act effi-
ciently but fairly. 14 Article 86 of the EU Treaty is a mechanism for con-
trolling the abusive nature of monopolistic entities or "undertakings." It
prohibits undertakings from: 1) holding a dominant position within a
substantial part of the common market; 2) and abusing the dominant
position which could potentially affect trade between Member States.' 5
Article 86 has been a powerful tool for the Community to ensure that
European markets remain competitive as integration continues.
Article 90 of the EU Treaty is similar to Article 86, but it focuses on
public undertakings" otherwise known as state monopolies; those un-
dertakings "provided exclusive rights by the State" - otherwise known
as state-supported monopolies.' 6 In particular, Article 90(1) obligates
Member States to refrain from maintaining measures that support a
public or exclusively-granted undertaking, which are contrary to the
EU Treaty, especially the competition articles.' 7 However, the Article
10. See George et al., supra note 2, at 111 n.3. See also TREATY ESTABLISHING THE
EUROPEAN UNION, Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. C-224/1, 1 C.M.L.R. 573 (1992) [hereinafter EU
TREATY].
11. The freedom articles are primarily aimed at eliminating trade barriers among the
Member States and include: Articles 30 to 36, freedom of goods; Articles 59 to 66 freedom
of services; and Articles 48 to 59 free movement for people and entities. EU TREATY, supra
note 10.
12. See generally Thomas H. Hefti, European Union Competition Law, 18 SETON
HALL LEGIS. J. 613, 614 (1994). See also EU TREATY, supra note 10, arts. 85-94 (referring
to competition) and art. 3(f) (explicitly obligating the Community to establish a system
ensuring that competition in the Common Market is not distorted).
13. See generally Siragusa, supra note 4, at 1069. For example, Article 222 provides
that the Community will not prejudice national rules governing property ownership, and
Article 37 requires Member States to adjust only those state monopolies of a commercial
character. Id.
14. See HANS MICKLETZ & STEPHEN WEATHERILL, EUROPEAN ECONOMIC LAW, 136
(1997); EU TREATY, supra note 10, arts. 85-94. Only Article 86 and Article 90 will be dis-
cussed in this paper.
15. EU TREATY, supra note 10, art. 86; BELLAMY & CHILD, supra note 1, at 388-90.
16. EU TREATY, supra note 10, art. 90; BELLAMY & CHILD, supra note 1, at 568-78.
17. EU TREATY, supra note 10, art. 90(1). Although the Court has never defined an
"exclusive right" clearly, it generally means that one undertaking dominates the whole
1999
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does not preclude granting exclusive rights to entities so long as they do
not violate other EC law.18 Therefore, the framers' balancing between
Member State rights and Community objectives creates an inherent
tension between the States and the Community.
Article 90(2) of the EU Treaty focuses on the public undertaking it-
self and emphasizes that even public undertakings that serve a general
economic interest or have a revenue-producing character can be subject
to the EU Treaty. 19 However, a public undertaking may be exempt if
the application of EU Treaty rules would obstruct the undertaking's
performance. 20 The purpose and nature of the undertaking can thus,
justify its exemption. But, if trade is affected "to such an extent" that it
would be contrary to the interests of the Community, then the public
monopoly might not be exempt. 21 The Community-Member State ten-
sion again emerges since public monopolies serving public interests may
be exempt from the EU Treaty, but not in certain circumstances.
Article 90(3) also plays a unique role in the Community-Member
State dynamic. It empowers the Commission "to ensure the application
of the provisions of this Article" and to "address appropriate directives
or decisions to Member States." 22 This section differs from the rest of
the EU Treaty, which only authorizes the Council of Ministers, in con-
junction with the European Parliament, to enact legislation. 23 Relying
on Article 90(3), the Commission can issue binding directives and
regulations to Member States on its own.24 Moreover, Article 90(3) does
not provide Member States with any ability to justify their position in
additional proceedings, as opposed to procedures provided when they
violate the freedom articles. 25 With the Court establishing the legiti-
macy of Article 90(3), the Commission has used it frequently to enact
legislation that aims to liberalize traditional state monopolies. 26
The EU Treaty also provides a specifically important tool for the
Court for imposing Community law on Member States. Article 177
grants the Court authority to provide preliminary rulings interpreting
the EU Treaty, as well as Community institutional behavior and legis-
lation. 27 The Court's purpose is to guarantee that Community law will
economic activity in that Member State. Romaniuk, supra note 4, at 1028 n.17 (citing
Marc Van der Woude, Article 90: "Competing for Competence" Competition Law Checklist
Competition Law Checklist, EUR. L. REV., 60, 61 (1991)).
18. See Siragusa, supra note 4, at 1070.
19. EU TREATY, supra note 10, art. 90(2).
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. EU TREATY, supra note 10, art. 90(3).
23. See BELLAMY & CHILD, supra note 1, at 578.
24. See Id.
25. See Romaniuk, supra note 4, at 1044-47.
26. Siragusa, supra note 4, at 1079-81.
27. Carl Otto Lenz, The Role and Mechanism of the Preliminary Ruling Procedure, 18
618 VOL. 27:4
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remain uniform among all Member States via their national courts.28
Although the Court is only supposed to "interpret" Community law, it
frequently makes clear to national courts how they should apply the
law. 29 Thus, under Article 177, the Court has considerable influence in
the application of Community law among Member States. 30
B. Increased Focus on Competition and Member State Reservations
Community competition policy has monitored the economic integra-
tion process via the use of the EU Treaty's freedom and competition ar-
ticles. 31 However, the drive for completing the common market, and
thus, for increased the use of competition policy became a prime focus
following the adoption of the Single European Act (SEA) in 1987, which
aimed to complete an internal market by 1992.32 The Commission has
been the most pro-market institution in the Community, and coupled
with support from the Court, the Commission increasingly has been in-
volved with initiating legislation and overseeing Member State action
in order to complete the internal market. 33 The Commission, however,
has found that competitiveness continues to be hampered, inter alia, by
a still-rigid and centralized regulatory environment within the Member
States. 34 It specifically has made liberalization of public and state-
supported monopolies a main priority.35 For instance, the Commission,
supported by Court decisions, has been able to introduce competition
into previously state-run services such as telecommunications, broad-
casting, electricity, gas, postal delivery, and now employment. 36
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 388, 389 (1994).
28. Id. at 391. Any national court can request the Court to review issues pertaining to
a national judgment that may conflict with Community law. The national court stays the
proceedings until the Court makes a decision, which is then binding upon the national
court. However, the Court does not follow a system of stare decisis, and a national court
may submit the same issues in a different case without being held to previously decided
rulings. Id.
29. See Jeffrey C. Cohen, The European Preliminary Reference and U.S. Supreme
Court Review of State Court Judgments: A Study in Comparative Judicial Federalism, 44
AM. J. COMP. L. 421, 428-434 (1996).
30. Andrew Adonis and Robert Rice, In the Hot Seat of Judgment: The European
Court is Coming Under Fire, Accused of Pushing a Political Agenda, FIN. TIMES, April 3,
1995, at 17.
31. MICKLETZ & WEATHERILL, supra note 14, at 4.
32. Dohms, supra note 8, at 805.
33. Romaniuk, supra note 4, at 1027-28.
34. Commission White Paper, supra note 3, art. III, ch. 2(A); Siragusa, supra note 4,
at 1067 (citing Commission of the European Communities, XXth Report on Competition
Policy 1990, at 125-26, 169 (1991), Commission of the European Communities, XXIst Re-
port on Competition Policy 1991, at 25-38, 15-41 (1992), and Commission of the European
Communities, XXIIIrd Report on Competition Policy 1993, at 30-36 (1994)).
35. Id.
36. MICKLETZ & WEATHERILL, supra note 14, at 185; See Case 320/91, Re Corbeau,
1993 E.C.R. 1-2533, [19931 4 C.M.L.R. 621 (1993) (regarding privatization of postal serv-
1999
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Although the Community's push toward improved competitiveness
through liberalization of state monopolies has been generally supported
by Member States, Member States have been concerned about the
Community's encroachment into their authority to provide public serv-
ices.3 7 Several States have suggested amending the EU Treaty to con-
solidate a special place for public services. 38 For instance, France re-
vealed the perspective that public services are not purely economic
entities that should merely respond to market efficiency because they
serve an important purpose in providing "economic and social cohesion
in Europe."39 In particular, streamlining public employment services
may increase Member State concerns, considering that these services
traditionally fell within the realm of Member States' labor and employ-
ment policies. 40 Thus, while liberalization of public monopolies pro-
motes the necessary Community goals of increased competitiveness and
employment, Member States have expressed their reservations about
whole-heartedly subjecting all public entities to market forces.
III. JOB CENTRE: FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Job Centre is a company that was in the process of becoming estab-
lished in Italy.41 The enterprise intended, inter alia, to conduct an em-
ployee placement service, providing both permanent and temporary
employment within Italy. 42 Moreover, Job Centre aimed to solicit busi-
ness from workers or undertakings beyond the Member State.43 A
mandatory placement system in Italy, however, administered by public
placement offices prevented the establishment of intermediaries in the
labor market.44 In particular, Civil Code Law No. 264, established in
1949, prohibits pursuit "of any activity, even if unremunerated, as an
intermediary between supply and demand for paid employment," and
Civil Code Law No. 1369, established in 1960, prohibits any entity from
hiring out temporary workers.
45
ices).
37. Commission White Paper, supra note 3, art. III, ch. 2, 2.1; Public Services, Inter-
governmental Conference Briefing No. 12 § III. (Second Update: 23rd March 1996) [hereaf-
ter Public Services Briefing] <http://../dg7/fiches/en/fichel2.htm>. For general informa-
tion about Member State concerns regarding Community authority, see generally PAUL
DAVIES, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LABOUR LAW, 49-62 (1996).
38. See Public Services Briefing, supra note 37.
39. Id. at pt. III. In fact, France advocated amending Article 90(2) to make it more
difficult for public services to be subject to EU Treaty rules. Id.
40. DAVIES, supra note 37, at 45-55.
41. Job Centre, [1998] 4 C.M.L.R. 708, 9.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. 1 6.
45. Id. 1 6-7.
620 VOL. 27:4
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On January 28, 1994, Job Centre's chairman applied for confirma-
tion of an instrument, which would legally establish the entity in It-
aly.46 Italian courts have the authority to administer these confirma-
tions. On March 31, 1994, the Tribunale Civile e Penale in Milan stayed
Job Centre's confirmation procedure. 47 Under Article 177, Job Centre
submitted two questions to the European Court of Justice for a prelimi-
nary ruling regarding EU Treaty articles. 48 On October 19, 1995, the
Court held that it had no jurisdiction to rule on the questions raised by
the Milan Tribunal because the Italian court was performing a non-
judicial function. 49 On December 18, 1995, the Milan Tribunal then
dismissed Job Centre's application for confirmation because its business
objectives were incompatible with Italy's employment law. 50
Job Centre then appealed to the Corte d'Appello in Milan, which
the Court suggested in its preliminary ruling as a sufficient exercise of
the Italian court's judicial function.5 1 The European Court of Justice
allowed the national court to resubmit the issues under Article 177.52
The Corte d'Appello, then stayed the proceedings and referred the case
to the Court for a preliminary ruling on EU Treaty articles pertaining
to freedom of services, freedom of worker movement, and competition.
53
In particular, Italy raised two significant issues: 1) whether main-
tenance of Italy's employment laws Article 11(1) of Law No. 264 and Ar-
ticle 1 of Law No. 1369 could be justified as an exercise of official
authority, which, under EU Treaty Articles 66 and 55, precludes a
Member State from applying Community laws; and 2) whether the
Italian laws conflicted with EU Treaty Articles 48 and 49 (freedom of
workers), Articles 59, 60, 62 and 66 (freedom of services), Article 86
(abuse of a dominant position within the market) and Article 90 (abuse
by a public undertaking within the market).
54
IV. JOB CENTRE DECISION
In relation to Articles 86 and 90, the Court held that Italy violated
Article 90(1) because it created a situation where public employment
46. Id. 1 13.
47. Id. at "Decision".
48. Id.
49. Id. 1 2. Under Article 177, a national court cannot submit a question to the Court
unless the national court provides a judgment. See Case C-111/94, Job Centre Coop. arl,
1995 E.C.R. 1-3361(1995) (giving more details about the decision). See EU TREATY, supra
note 10, art. 177.
50. Job Centre, [1998] 4 C.M.L.R. 708, 11.
51. Id. J 3 & "Decision."
52. Id.
53. Id. J1 13-14.
54. Id.
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agencies could not avoid infringing Article 86. 55 The Court determined
that an undertaking's inability to avoid abuse of a dominant position
emerges when all the following conditions are met: 1) public placement
offices are "manifestly unable to satisfy demand" on the market for all
types of activity; 2) employee placement by private groups is deemed
"impossible" due to the enforcement of statutory provisions under which
such activities are prohibited; and 3) the placement activities under re-
view could possibly extend to nationals or to the territory of other
Member States.56 According to the Court, Laws No. 264 and No. 1369
should be set aside.
The Court first focused on whether Job Centre was a public under-
taking subject to the EU Treaty under Article 90. The Court has
broadly interpreted public undertaking to include "every entity engaged
in an economic activity regardless of its status and the way in which it
is financed.. .... 57 The Court found the state's employment service was
an undertaking, rejecting Italy's argument that entities supporting na-
tional solidarity principles should be considered "non-economic," and
thus, not an undertaking. In terms of the possible exception within Ar-
ticle 90(2), the Court briefly mentioned whether application of the EU
Treaty rules would obstruct the undertaking's performance. 58 It held
that if the undertaking was unable to satisfy demand, then the EU
Treaty articles, particularly Article 86, would apply regardless.
59
The Court then turned to whether Italy was liable under Article
90(1) for causing the monopoly's abuse by maintaining employment
laws No. 264 and No. 1369.60 Although it reiterated that a Member
State will not be liable under Article 86 for the "mere creation" of a
public monopoly, it also stated that the EU Treaty requires Member
States to refrain from maintaining measures, which could destroy the
effectiveness of the competition rules.6 1 The Court then held that when
55. Id. at "Decision." Article 90(1) states: "[I1n the case of public undertakings and
undertakings to which Member States grant special or exclusive rights, Member States
shall neither enact nor maintain in force any measure contrary to the rules contained in
this Treaty, in particular to those rules provided for in Article 6 [discrimination] and Arti-
cles. 85 to 94 [competition articles]." EU TREATY, supra note 10, art. 90(1). See supra
notes 8 to 30, and accompanying text (pertaining to Article 90).
56. Job Centre, [1998] 4 C.M.L.R. 708, at "Decision."
57. Id. See also Commission Directive 80/723/EEC of 25 June 1980, on the Transpar-
ency of Financial Relations Between Member States and Public Undertakings, art. 2,
1980 O.J. (L 195) (1980) (showing how the Commission has also taken a broad view of
public undertakings).
58. Job Centre, [1998] 4 C.M.L.R. 708, at "Decision." The Court did not really analyze
whether the entity was a public undertaking but referred to Case C-41/90, Hofner & El-
ser v. Macrotron GmbH, (1991) E.C.R. 1-1979, [1993] 4 C.M.L.R. 306 (1993), which first
determined whether public employment services constituted an undertaking.
59. Job Centre, [1998] 4 C.M.L.R. 708, at "Decision."
60. Id.
61. Id. (referring to holding in Case 131/77, NV GB-INNO-BM (INNO) v. Vereniging
VOL. 27:4
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an undertaking cannot avoid abusing its dominant position under Arti-
cle 86, due to Member State laws supporting its behavior, then the
Member State violates its duty under Article 90(1).62
The Court then analyzed whether, under Article 86, the undertak-
ing abused its position.63 First, the Court reiterated that a dominant
position exists when an undertaking is vested with a legal monopoly.
64
Second, the Court affirmed that abuse under Article 86(b) amounted to
behavior limiting the service and prejudicing consumers 65 and that the
inability to satisfy market demand met this definition.66 It found that
an inability to serve "such an extensive and differentiated [employment]
market... subject to enormous changes as a result of economic and so-
cial developments" constituted an inability to satisfy demand.67 Since
Italy's measures completely prohibited private entities from competing
as intermediaries, it directly resulted in the public undertaking's in-
ability to satisfy demand. Third, under Article 86, the abusive conduct
must affect trade, and the Court found that employee placement could
potentially affect individuals from other Member States.68 Italy, there-
fore, was liable for violating Article 86 in conjunction with its duty in
Article 90(1).69
The Court also held that because the laws violated Articles 86 and
90(1), it was not necessary to determine whether they also violated Ar-
ticle 59, free movement of services, or Article 52, right to establishment
(which the Advocate General considered relevant).7 0 The Court also
dismissed the use of Articles 48 and 49 (free movement of labor) be-
cause if Job Centre had been established, it would be one legal business
entity and thus would not be considered a "worker."
71
van de Kleinhanddelaars in Tabak (ATAB), 1977 E.C.R. 2115, [1978] 1 C.M.L.R. 283
(1977)).
62. Id.
63. Id. Article 86 states: "Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant posi-
tion within the common market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incom-
patible with the common market in so far as it may affect trade between Member States."
EU TREATY, supra note 10, art. 86.
64. Job Centre, [1998] 4 C.M.L.R. 708 (referring to holding in Case 311/84, CBEM v.






70. Id. 11 25-32 & "Decision."
71. ld. at "Decision".
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V. JOB CENTRE CONFIRMS COURT'S APPROACH FOR ACCOMMODATING
COMMISSION ATTACK ON PUBLIC MONOPOLIES
The Commission's perspective, as discussed previously, has become
increasingly hostile toward publicly supported and owned monopolies.
Likewise, the Court has aligned with the Commission's deregulatory
approach. In doing so, the Court has shifted its analytical approach to
increase reliance on Article 90, which was rarely invoked prior to the
1987 Single European Act.7 2 In the 1990's, Article 90 in conjunction
with Article 86 has become a primary force for dismantling state mo-
nopolies, and thus, Community liberalization of areas traditionally
managed by Member States, such as telecommunications, broadcasting,
insurance, electricity, transport, gas, postal, and employment services.
73
As a result, State autonomy to enact or maintain domestic legislation
has been restrained.
A. "Public Undertaking"Definition Remains Broad
Job Centre confirms legal precedent defining an undertaking.
When addressing this issue, the Court generally will focus on whether
the entity fits within the definition of undertaking under Article 86 and
Article 90, and in light of increased emphasis on competition and inte-
gration, this definition has been defined broadly.
In Hofner & Elser v. Macrotron GmbH, undertaking was clearly de-
fined as encompassing every entity engaged in an economic activity, re-
gardless of the legal status of the entity and the way it has been fi-
nanced. 74 The Court in Hofner found executive recruitment services to
be an economic activity, and thus, an undertaking.75 However, in
Poucet & Pistre v. Assurances Generales de France & Others, the Court
found that two social security agencies were not considered undertak-
ings. 76 In particular, the Court pointed to the agency's non-profit-
making nature and to the fact that compulsory contribution payments
72. See Romaniuk, supra note 4, at 1029-31.
73. See Siragusa, supra note 4, at 1068-69; MICKLETZ & WEATHERILL, supra note 14,
at 185; C-320/91, Corbeau, (1993) ECR 1-2533, [19911 4 C.M.L.R. 621 (regarding deregula-
tion of postal services). See also Hofner, [1993] 4 C.M.L.R. 306 and Job Centre, [1998] 4
C.M.L.R. 708 (regarding deregulation of public employment services). Article 90(1) makes
Member States directly liable for legislation supporting monopolies and Article 90(3) gives
the Commission unique authority to legislate and enforce directly against Member States
when they violate the article. See supra, notes 8-30, and accompanying text.
74. Hofner, [1993] 4 C.M.L.R. 306, at "Judgment," 1 121-24.
75. Id. 1 23.
76. Case C-70/95, Sodamere SA & Others v. Regione Lombardia, [1991] 3 C.M.L.R.
591, J1 24-26 (1997). See also Case C159-160/91, Poucet & Pistre v. Assurances Genera-
les de France and Others (1993) ECR 1-637.
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were indispensable to the principle of solidarity. 77 Solidarity, which in-
volves the redistribution of income, the seems to be the more vital re-
quirement. The Court has found non-profit-making bodies with little
solidarity supporting them to be engaging in economic activity and
thus, public undertakings.
78
In Job Centre, the Court determined public service agencies to be
undertakings as in Hofner.7 9 Italy, however, argued that because em-
ployment agencies were established for social objectives, similar to the
social security agencies in Poucet, they were not economic activities and
thus, not public undertakings. 80 The Court in Job Centre, however, dis-
tinguished Poucet. It implied that employment agencies were not based
on solidarity, and were not completely non-profit-making.8 1 The Court
justified its decision, stating that in Hofner, employment procurement
was a business activity.8 2 Job Centre affirmed that competition rules
can impact Member State entities, which serve social purposes but fail
to provide redistribution of income.
B. Article 86: Abuse Continues to Be Interpreted Broadly
Job Centre reflected the Court's broad interpretation of abuse un-
der Article 86. Like other terms in Articles 86 and 90, "abuse" also has
undergone broadening. In particular, Article 86(b) requires "limiting
production, markets, or technical development to the prejudice of con-
sumers."8 3 Traditionally, only active behavior by an undertaking con-
stituted abuse of a dominant position.8 4 However, in Hofner, the State's
executive recruitment agency's inability to satisfy market demand -
passive behavior - constituted abuse as well.8 5
In Job Centre, the Court affirmed the inability-to-satisfy-demand
approach under Article 86(b) and provided further clarification. 86 Advo-
cate General Elmer, who wrote the Advocate General's opinion, agreed
with the Court that the diversity of the employment service market in
terms of consumers and users made it impossible for Italy's employ-
ment service to satisfy demand.8 7  However, Elmer suggested that
abuse should not be determined for the composite group, but for each
77. Id., 1 24-26.
78. Id.
79. Job Centre, [1998] 4 C.M.L.R. 708, at "Decision."
80. Id. 1 34.
81. Id. at "Decision."
82. Id.
83. EU TREATY, supra note 10, art. 86(b).
84. See MICKLETZ & WEATHERILL, supra note 14, at 136-38
85. Hofner, [1993] 4 C.M.L.R. 306, at "Judgment," 34; Siragusa, supra note 4, at
1076-77.
86. Job Centre, [1998] 4 C.M.L.R. 708, at "Decision."
87. Id. 52-56.
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sector within that market because of the huge diversity involved.8 8 He
supported his reasoning with previous case law involving goods.8 9 For
instance, in Michelin v. E.C. Commission, the tire market was sepa-
rated into used and new tires, and the Court then determined whether
the entity could satisfy either. 90 However, in Job Centre, the Court ig-
nored this segmented approach, and stated that because one entity
could not satisfy all of the types of employment services in the market,
it had abused its position.9 1 As a result, a public monopoly could be
eliminated when in fact, it might be able to satisfy demand in certain
portions of the employment services market. The Court's broadening of
"abuse" by failing to segment the markets reveals its pro-Commission
approach.
C. Member State Liability Increased under Article 90(1)
Most importantly, the Court in Job Centre affirmed its use of Arti-
cles 86 and 90(1), making Member States more liable for a state monop-
oly's abuse of its position.92 Previously, the Court held in Sacchi that a
Member State under Article 90(1) could not itself violate Article 86, and
so Italian legislation granting public entity, RAI (a radio and television
monopoly), exclusive rights, did not violate the EU Treaty. 93 In Sacchi,
the Commission's perspective was quite different than its deregulatory
approach of the 1990's. 94 It stated that the "grant of exclusive rights [by
a Member State] does not constitute in itself an infringement of Article
90, [and] [slince Article 86 does not prohibit a dominant position [only
abuse of that position] ... Article 90 cannot give rise to liabilities
greater than those arising under Article 86."95 Not surprisingly, the
Court also supported this position, holding that a mere grant or exten-
sion of a right to a public undertaking under Article 90(1) "is not as
such incompatible with" Article 86.96 Thus, if the undertaking did en-
gage in abusive conduct, then Article 86 alone applied, and if no abusive
conduct existed, then Article 90(1) could not apply in conjunction with
Article 86.97 A Member State's duty under Article 90(1) was deemed
mutually exclusive from its duty under Article 86.
However, in 1991, the Court broadened the meaning of Article 90(1)
88. Id. 50.
89. Id.
90. Id. See also Case 322/81, Michelin v. E.C. Commission, [1983] ECR 3461, [1985] 1
C.M.L.R. 282 (1985).
91. Id. at "Decision".
92. See Romaniuk, supra note 4, at 1035.
93. Case 155/73, Sacchi, 1974 E.C.R. 408, 428-30, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. 177 (1974).
94. Sacchi, 1974 E.C.R. at 414.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 429.
97. Siragusa, supra note 4, at 1071-72.
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to make Member States liable under Article 86 for merely granting ex-
clusive rights to an undertaking.98 In Hofner, the Commission argued
that under Article 90(1) and Article 86, a Member State should be liable
for maintaining measures that support a monopoly where the "grantee
of the monopoly is not willing or able to carry out that task fully."99
Reiterating Scacchi, the Court held that Germany was liable under Ar-
ticle 90(1) because even though a Member State cannot be responsible
for "creating a dominant position by granting an exclusive right within
the meaning of Article 86 of the Treaty" if that results in a situation
where the public undertaking "cannot avoid abusing its dominant posi-
tion" under Article 86, then the Member State shall be liable. 10 0 There-
fore, Member States could be directly liable for supporting monopolies
that exercised abuse.
The Court has affirmed this new approach in subsequent case law,
but not consistently, making it unclear what behavior triggers Member
State liability. For instance, in Merci Convenzionali Porto Di Genova
SpA v. Siderurgica Gabrielli SpA (Merci) and in Elliniki Radiophonia
Tileorassi AE & Panellinia Omospondia Syllogon Prossopikou v. Dimo-
tiki Etairia, et al. (ERT), the Court held that a Member State can be li-
able under Article 86 and Article 90(1) if the undertaking, in merely ex-
ercising exclusive rights, "cannot avoid abusing the dominant
position."'101 However, the Court added that liability can also emerge
when the granting of such rights "leads to" or "induces" an undertaking
to infringe Article 86.102 This alternative interpretation of Hofner
makes it easier to find Member States liable. Instead of requiring only
"unavoidable abuse," which suggests that State legislation directly
causes abuse, this alternative language suggests that Member State
legislation can be one of several reasons for an undertaking's abuse, yet
still making Member States liable.
With both Merci and ERT concerning discrimination against other
Member States, 10 3 the Court might have applied a softer Hofner test in
order to find Member States liable. In fact, in non-discrimination cases,
98. Id. at 1069-71; Romaniuk, supra note 4, at 1035-36.
99. Hofner, [1993] 4 C.M.L.R. 306, at "Judgment," 1 18.
100. Id. at "Judgment," 1 29.
101. Case C-179/90, Merci Convenzionali Porto Di Genova SpA v. Siderurgica Gabrielli
SpA, [19941 C.M.L.R. 422, Decision (1991) [hereinafter Merci]; Case C-260/89, Elliniki
Radiophonia Tileorassi AE & Panellinia Omospondia Syllogon Prossopikou v. Dimotiki
Etairia, et al., 1991 E.C.J. CELEX LEXIS 2506 (1991) [hereinafter ERT].
102. Merci, [1994] C.M.L.R. 422, at "Decision"; ERT, 1991 E.C.J. CELIX LEXIS 2506,
37.
103. Legislation in Merci excluded non-Italian dock workers and dock companies, and
ERT excluded non-Greek entities, compared with Hofner which did not specifically ex-
clude other Member States in favor of its own nationals. See Merci, [1994] C.M.L.R. 422;
ERT, 1991 E.C.J. CELEX LEXIS 2506; and Hofner, [1993] 4 C.M.L.R. 306 (referring to
possible discrimination).
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the Court has applied the strict Hofner test, requiring the causal rela-
tionship between Member State legislation and the undertaking's abuse
to be more direct. For instance, in Societe Civile Agricole du Centre
d'Insemination de la Crespelle v. Cooperative d'Elevage et
d'Insemination Artificielle du Departement de la Mayenne, the Court
found that although the Member State granted an exclusive right re-
sulting in a dominant position, the alleged abuse was not the "direct
consequence of the national law."1° 4 Also, in Chemische Afvalstoffen
Dusseldorp BV & Others v. Minister Van Volkshuisvesting, the Court
stated that liability exists if the entity "caused the breach of Article 86",
and considering the entity's pricing policy was not an "inevitable result"
of any exclusive rights granted, the Netherlands did not violate Article
90(1).105 Discrimination might be a factor, but the Court does not
clearly say so.
Another problem with the Hofner approach is the Court's inconsis-
tency in analyzing whether an exclusive right has even been granted.
10 6
In Hofner, the Court ignored analyzing whether Germany had conferred
an exclusive right to public service agencies. 107 However, in the Giorgio
Banchero Decision, the Court failed to find any violation because it de-
termined that the State had not granted an exclusive right to the en-
tity.10 8 The Italian legislation, which reserved retail sale of manufac-
tured tobacco products to distributors authorized by the state, did not
"cause" the channeling of sales or prejudice to consumers leading to un-
satisfied demand. 10 9 The Court concluded that the legislation "merely
governs [the retailers] access" and does not grant "exclusive distribution
rights" to retailers. 1 0 The different treatment may turn on the nature
of the exclusive right,1 ' but the Court does not delineate clear factors to
help determine the different applications.11
2
In Job Centre, the Court affirmed the Hofner approach broadening
Sacchi.1 3 The Court held that the Italian measures supporting public
placement agencies directly resulted in the public entity's inability "to
104. Case C-323/93, Societe Civile Agricole du Centre d'Insemination de la Crespelle v.
Cooperative d'Elevage et d'Insemination Artificielle du Departement de la Mayenne, 1994
E.C.J. CELEX LEXIS 2581, 18-20 (1994).
105. Case C-203/96, Chemische Afvalstoffen Dusseldorp BV & Others v. Minister Van
Volkshuisvesting, [1998] 3 C.M.L.R. 873, 101 (1998) [hereinafter Chemische].
106. See generally Romaniuk, supra note 4 (discussing the inconsistent analysis of an
exclusive right).
107. See Romaniuk, supra note 4, at 1047-48.




111. See Romaniuk, supra note 4 (discussing the conditions when the Court analyzes
the granting of an exclusive right).
112. See Case C-163/96, Silvano Raso & Others, 4 C.M.L.R. 737, "Opinion," 61-62.
113. Job Centre, [1998] 4 C.M.L.R. 708, at "Decision."
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avoid abuse."114 Italy, therefore, was liable for supporting the public
employment agencies. 115 The Court's application of Hofner seems gen-
erally consistent with recent case law. Considering that Job Centre did
not involve discrimination," 6 the holding supports the notion that the
strict Hofner test is being used in non-discrimination cases, as well as
in discrimination cases. And, considering Job Centre's facts were very
similar to Hofner, the Court's neglect to analyze whether an exclusive
right even existed is not surprising.1" 7 Nevertheless, Italy's argument
that the legislation failed to grant employment agencies any exclusive
rights did not go unnoticed." 8 In Advocate General Elmer's opinion in
Job Centre, he analyzed whether the State conferred an exclusive right
upon the undertaking.11 9 He determined that Law No. 264, which
clearly prohibited any intermediaries, was an exclusive grant to the
Italian employment agency.120 But, he noted that Law No. 1369, pro-
hibiting the hiring of temporary staff, was a general prohibition not
granting an exclusive right to any group. 121 While, Job Centre seems
legally consistent with other cases, Elmer's difference of opinion reflects
the ongoing problem in how to apply Hofner.
One negative consequence of this approach is that it is not clear
when a Member State will be liable for violating the EU Treaty. In not
clearly delineating the boundary line between when a Member State
can allow for the mere establishment of a dominant position and when
it violates the EU Treaty by directly causing an undertaking's abuse,
Member States are less able to predict what is acceptable legislation
under the EU Treaty.
By altering the analysis to increase Member State liability under
Article 90(1) and Article 86, yet failing to clarify how that approach is
applied, the Court has made Member States more vulnerable to de-
regulation of their public services, and thus, supports the Commission's
objective.
D. Member State Justification Under Article 90(2) Remains Narrow
Job Centre revealed the increased difficulty Member States have in
justifying public monopoly behavior for public interest reasons. Under
Article 90(2), a Member State can argue that the public entity is en-





118. See Id. 1 3.
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EU Treaty rules obstruct the performance of the entity's tasks.122 How-
ever, the Court has increasingly narrowed the application of this excep-
tion to make it very difficult for public monopolies to remain exempt
from the EU Treaty.
123
The Court has narrowly defined an undertaking "entrusted with a
general economic interest." "Entrusted" requires that certain obliga-
tions are imposed on the public entity by the State to satisfy public in-
terest. 124 The Court has required entities serving a general economic
interest to "exhibit special characteristics" compared with other activi-
ties.125 For instance, dock work services do not reveal special charac-
teristics, but universal mooring, postal, and waste management serv-
ices do constitute general economic interests.
26
Whether the EU Treaty "obstructs performance" of a public under-
taking, serving a general economic interest also has been narrowed, but
rather inconsistently. For instance, in Sacchi, obstruction of perform-
ance referred to whether the EU Treaty was "incompatible" with the
performance of the television monopoly's task. 127 In Hofner, the Court
referred to Sacchi, but further narrowed Article 90(2) by holding that
"application of Article 86 of the EU Treaty cannot obstruct the perform-
ance of the particular task" when the entity "is not in a position to sat-
isfy demand in that area."'
128
However, another test has emerged. The Court in Corbeau sug-
gested that obstruction was determined by whether restricting or ex-
cluding competition was "necessary" to perform its task - in particular,
to provide economically acceptable conditions. 129 If the undertaking has
"economic equilibrium" then it will be able to offset non-profitable sec-
tors with its profitable ones, and thus, can justify restricting competi-
tion in its profitable sectors. 30 The Court's narrow definition led to
finding that certain aspects of the postal service would not suffer from
disequilibrium if subjected to competition.' 3 ' Chemische also supports
this "strict scrutiny" approach, since the Court endorsed the Commis-
122. EU TREATY, supra note 10, at art 90(2).
123. See Siragusa, supra note 4, at 1074-78.
124. Chemische, [1998] 3 C.M.L.R. 873, 1 103.
125. See generally Case C-266/96, Corsica Ferries France SA v. Gruppo Antichi Or-
meggiatori Del Porto Di Genova Coop, ARL & Others, [1998] 5 C.M.L.R. 402, "Opinion,"
61 (1998) (regarding fees charged for mooring services).
126. See id. Corbeau, [1993] 4 C.M.L.R. 621(regarding postal service), Merci, [1994] 4
C.M.L.R. 422 (regarding dock workers), and Chemische, 3 C.M.L.R. 873 (regarding waste
service).
127. Sacchi, 1974 E.C.R., at 429, 15. The Court in Sacchi did not apply the facts to
Article 90(2) because it did not find Italy liable under Article 90(1). Id. at 428-29, 1 14.
128. Hofner, [1993] 4 C.M.L.R. 306, at "Judgment," J 25-26.
129. Corbeau, [1993] 4 C.M.L.R. 621, at "Decision".
130. Id. 1 17-19.
131. See Siragusa, supra note 4, at 1075-76.
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sion's suggestion that obstruction exists when the objective cannot be
carried out "equally well by any other means." 132 Again, the Court does
not make clear when these different tests apply.
In Job Centre, the Court used the "incompatible" language of Sac-
chi and followed the same reasoning as in Hofner.133 Advocate General
Elmer gave little discussion to Article 90(2), merely reiterating that
Hofner deemed it inapplicable.1 3 4 Job Centre failed to provide any clar-
ity on why this approach was taken, but it is, nevertheless, clear that
Article 90(2) will continue to be construed narrowly.
VI. IMPLICATIONS
The Court's position on public service monopolies in Job Centre and
in other recent cases seems to reflect the Commission's economic per-
spective and interest in dismantling Member State laws that support
monopolies. The decision in Job Centre has confirmed the broad inter-
pretation of undertaking and abuse, the Member State's increased li-
ability under Article 90(1), and the State's reduced capacity to justify
support for a public service undertaking under Article 90(2). In light of
ongoing challenges to job creation, competition, and integration, the
Court will likely continue to be an ally of the Commission and a strong
promoter of the Community's agenda.
Nevertheless, the Court is also aware of the tension between Mem-
ber State and Community authority. The debate on the Community's
explicit authority into new realms such as employment policy will likely
continue, as will discussion about the erosion of socially-underpinned
objectives for public services. The Court will, therefore, have to balance
its Community-oriented objectives with national court sentiment and
thus, to a certain extent Member State sentiment, since its primary ve-
hicle for shaping Member State behavior is through the cooperation of
the national courts via Article 177.
132. Chemische, [1998] 3 C.M.L.R. 873, at "Opinion," 1 108.
133. Job Centre, [1998] 4 C.M.L.R. 708 at "Decision."
134. Id. at opinion.
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